14891774-eb59-4eba-a97f-f2728ba060d920260517102920Depositor Namedepositor_email@address.comRUA Metadata Exporter2002-0724Christophe EmmanuelPrematStockholm Unversityhttps://ror.org/05f0yaq80Department of Romance Studies and Classicshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6107-735XJean-MichelDe WaeleUniversité Libre de Bruxelleshttps://ror.org/01r9htc13Department of Political ScienceMichelPerottinoCharles Universityhttps://ror.org/024d6js02Institute of Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1910-4075The health crisis the world is going through is arguably the first contemporary “global crisis” that threatens the world with generalized anomy and its new economic option, globalization. It has struck China, settles in Europe, strikes heavily in the United States and Latin America, and is spreading rapidly in other continents. The same problem has to be faced by different States and it addresses fascinating questions to social and political sciences. To understand, we must compare said political scientist Giovanni Sartori. Comparing the way in which States are managing this crisis can allow us to understand the global crisis and the national specificities. The first reaction of the States is a considerable predilection for sanitary methods of quarantine and containment. The aim is to understand the effects of this crisis on every political system and every legal system. How were the actions taken, received, approved or challenged? How do different national political cultures adapt to new situations? What does this tell us about each of the societies, about each of the political regimes and, ultimately, about the place of the State in contemporary societies? Are the legal instruments one of the means to manage the crisis? Is the organization of the State reinforced or weakened in the context of the health emergency? What do these levers tell us about the metamorphoses of the contemporary State in a period of unprecedented health crisis?Since April 2020, a new research network in political science, discourse analysis and law has been established on the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the States (Posoc19, Pouvoirs et Sociétés Face à la Crise du COVID-19). The objective of the current project is to focus on the axis of expertise in order to empower the network and be able to compare the ways in which political systems are based on scientific expertise. To what extent is political power based on scientific expertise? Is the expertise autonomous?What is the effect of expertise on public opinion? How does it help to fight against the spread of fake news? A research group inside the network Posoc19 has been established in May 2020 and focuses on the comparison of experts' profiles and discourses. During the spring of 2020 and during the COVID-19 pandemic, new expert figures emerged in connection with public health issues. In some countries, official expert figures have even imposed themselves in order to be able to legitimize the decisions taken by the political authorities, while in other countries, there has been more visibility of conflicts of expertise involving experts appointed by political power (sacralization of the expert who in this case assumes a political function, with or without political responsibility to bear) versus university experts and researchers. In addition, the media have sometimes selected certain experts for other reasons (proximity to lobbies, in particular pharmaceuticals, political and / or partisan positions, relations with a cabinet or a company, etc.), which made the situation even more complex. In some cases "super experts" have emerged, in others more collegial formats have been chosen.Some countries opted for mixed strategies with a combination of superexperts and committees. In addition to the fundamental question of the choice of experts (on a political, scientific, media, etc. basis) there has also been the question of political responsibility for the choices made, both in the short and in the long term. The gradual shift to a slower time frame (after the first few weeks in an emergency) makes it possible to ask questions and offer an analysis of different national cases, especially when economic imperatives seem to be taking over. It is also important to know if the experts influenced incumbent politicians on the choice of a strategy or if it was the strategy that made politicians choose the experts. The analysis of public policies is relevant here in order to compare the actors (experts / committees / government / administration /politicians), the agenda and the nature of the decision. The final aim of the research is to produce an accurate typology of systems of expertise due to the comparative approach.This book is aimed at researchers, students, and practitioners interested in how the voices of experts have been conveyed in the public sphere during the early waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond controversies over the selection of these experts by governments or the media, the book draws on methodologies from discourse analysis, media studies, political science, sociology, and social psychology to compare the role that experts played in justifying unpopular political decisions. Several configurations have emerged, including politically contested systems with medical heroes, bureaucratized systems with a super-reference expert, or more collegiate forms of committees tasked with providing political leaders with the necessary reports to justify political decisions.09052024978-91-7635-247-2978-91-7635-248-9978-91-7635-249-6978-91-7635-250-2Stockholm University PressStockholmhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/10.16993/bcohttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/e/10.16993/bcohttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/6a6c7e0c-81e3-41d8-9fd3-c41ed35ae7a6.pdfhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/6a6c7e0c-81e3-41d8-9fd3-c41ed35ae7a6.pdfChristophe EmmanuelPrematStockholm Universityhttps://ror.org/05f0yaq80Department of Romance Studies and Classicshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6107-735XJean-MichelDe WaeleUniversité Libre de Bruxelleshttps://ror.org/01r9htc13Department of Political ScienceMichelPerottinoCharles Universityhttps://ror.org/024d6js02Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1910-40750905202410.16993/bco.ahttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.ahttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/ac0383d0-b9d7-45c4-9173-dec0740d1287.pdfAlexisChapelanUniversity of Bucharesthttps://ror.org/02x2v6p15Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8990-6188Vladimir AdrianCosteaNational Institute of Statistics in Romaniahttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6101-7688The chapter sets out the shed light on the complex politico-ideological embeddings of expertise in the context of the current crisis. The pandemic has brought to the forefront the role of public health experts, who have become instrumental in suggesting policies to counteract the spread of the novel coronavirus. These experts range from internationally renowned researchers to anonymous frontline workers in healthcare such as nurses, paramedics or family practitioners. This emphasis on expertise and highly technical know-how sometimes came at the expense of elected political personnel, with democratic mechanisms temporarily supplanted by technocratic decision-making. However, the narrative that emerged on expertise and the place of experts was far from monolithic. We will focus henceforth on the crystallisation of a counter-narrative violently denouncing the newfound power of experts and the scientific consensus undergirding it. The notion of “epistemological populism” acts as a theoretical bridgehead between the traditional political understanding of the populist label and the wider cultural-epistemic implications of the semiotics of defiance that populism enacts in modern societies. The recent focus on “epistemological populism” fruitfully intersects with a century-long reflection on the rise of technostructures and dis-ideologisation, providing a fresh, heterodox perspective on the backlash to these phenomena.0905202410.16993/bco.bhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.bhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/d1d026fe-75ca-47ab-8b6c-996f2d978ed1.pdfAnnamaria Silvanade RosaSapienza University of Romehttps://ror.org/02be6w209Faculty of Medicine and Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-2945-6103TerriMannariniUniversity of Salentohttps://ror.org/03fc1k060Department of Human and Social Scienceshttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3683-8035Lorena Gilde MontesUniversity of the Basque Countryhttps://ror.org/000xsnr85Social Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8430-5105Andrei CorneliuHolmanAlexandru Ioan Cuza University of IașiPsychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9309-3821Mary AnneLauriUniversity of Maltahttps://ror.org/03a62bv60Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5219-8010LilianNeguraUniversity of Ottawahttps://ror.org/03c4mmv16School of social workhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5224-5451Andréia IsabelGiacomozziFederal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolishttps://ror.org/041akq887Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-3172-5800Andréa Barbaráda Silva BousfieldFederal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolishttps://ror.org/041akq887Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4333-4719Ana MariaJustoFederal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolishttps://ror.org/041akq887Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2056-3575Marthade AlbaUniversidad Autónoma Metropolitana-IztapalapaSociologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6653-4027SusanaSeidmannUniversity of Belgrano, Buenos Aireshttps://ror.org/03v5ycz03Psychologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6653-4027RisaPermanadeliIndonesian Center of Social Representations Studies, JakartaSocial Representations Studieshttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6334-878XKaraboSitto-KaundaUniversity of Pretoriahttps://ror.org/00g0p6g84Strategic Communicationhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5146-9189ElizabethLubingaUniversity of Johannesburghttps://ror.org/04z6c2n17Strategic Communicationhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1811-7421The role of expert, institutional and media communication in the pandemic emergency is crucial, since it contributes to spread collective interpretations of the crisis that drive community responses. Based on social representations theory approach, and specifically relying on the notions of collective symbolic coping and polemical social representations, the study presents 10 country-based case studies of public communication with the aim of exploring the social representations of COVID-19 during the first wave of the outbreak. Multiple communication sources from ten countries in five geo-cultural contexts (Europe, North America, Latino America, Asia, Africa) were selected and analysed: institutional websites; international/national/local newspapers and news channels; national/international press agencies; and social media platforms. Results highlighted the prevalence of multi-vocality and polemical social representations, along with outgroup blaming and stigmatisation processes, the use of military and naturalistic metaphors, antinomies, and discourse polarisation. Implications for effective public communication in crisis management are discussed.0905202410.16993/bco.chttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.chttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/89111c92-5b62-445e-9d6e-70e32518d5c0.pdfWilliamGuéraicheUniversity of Wollongong Dubaihttps://ror.org/0447ajy94International Relationshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5530-3074The nexus between authorities and experts in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) differs from that of the Western democracies. The decision-making process is complex, a blend of Bedouin tradition, modern administration and nation branding. On the surface, it seems that the Sheikhs took all decisions during the pandemic. The reality was of course more complex. Whilst the sheikhs might still jealously guard their power, they know how to listen to outside parties (including experts in different fields) before taking important decisions. For instance, the cooperation on the coronavirus (SARS) with World Health Organisation since 2003 justified the health protocol implemented at the inception of the pandemic. The crisis was therefore no exception and revealed that the experts do not interact with decision-makers in the media. There had been no debate about the chloroquine, herd immunity or the effectiveness of the vaccines. Experts oriented the political decisions but never intervened as independent actors in the public debate.0905202410.16993/bco.dhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.dhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/e57436ed-3f79-4efe-9569-5f9270d1f716.pdfArnaud Paul FrançoisGrivaudUniversité Paris Citéhttps://ror.org/05f82e368East-Asian Studies (LCAO), CRCAOhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5274-0826The outbreak of COVID-19 in Japan – the first country to officially report a case outside China – was an opportunity to revive the debate on the relationship between policymakers and scientific experts. The latter, selected and convened in a committee by the government, played a very important role in defining policy responses to coronavirus and in risk communication to the Japanese public. Criticism then fluctuated between the denunciation of a so-called “government of experts” lacking democratic legitimacy (scientifization of politics) and that of “experts at the mercy of the government” whose scientific legitimacy had been manipulated (politicization of science). In order to go beyond these two archetypal representations, this chapter analyses in detail the ways in which experts and their opinions were integrated into the decision-making process, as well as the reactions of the actors involved in the Japanese political and media ecosystem during the COVID-19 pandemic. To do so, this study draws on the literature on knowledge brokers – intermediary actors between science and politics – and on official documents (reports, legal texts, etc.), press articles and testimonies of experts and political actors. This study shows that the relationship between experts and policy-makers was built in a trial-and-error manner, with readjustments according to the balance of power, the perception of their respective roles, as well as the ambivalent and paradoxical reactions of the media, the public and some external specialists. In this context of uncertainty and high “social request for expertise”, although political actors have relied on experts as an essential source of legitimacy for their decisions, the latter have not hesitated to express their disagreements with the government, as well as to demand a clearer division of responsibilities and more transparency, in order to create a decision-making process that would be both more attentive to scientific research and more democratic.0905202410.16993/bco.ehttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.ehttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/468e794d-41cd-48bc-9645-3b9fdd1d1137.pdfCélineMavrotUniversity of Lausannehttps://ror.org/019whta54Institution of Social Scienceshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9603-5790This contribution analyses the place of experts during the COVID-19 crisis management in Switzerland. In this situation, political authorities strongly emphasised that their decision relied on the scientific expertise, to an unprecedented extend in Switzerland. The government set up a double system of expertise: an independent and consultative scientific task force on the one hand, and experts from national public agencies on the other hand. This chapter has three focuses. First, it examines the function of this system of expertise for the political authorities (responsibility-sharing and blame avoidance mechanisms). By displaying its collaboration with scientific experts, the government gains some leeway to adopt potentially unpopular measures, and asserts the need to stand united in the crisis. Second, the chapter analyses the composition of these two expert panels, as well as their independence from political authorities. It shows that while external experts voiced public criticism against some political decisions, the administrative experts remained subordinated to the political hierarchy. Third, the chapter highlights the role of counter-power that scientific expertise can temporarily play in such a situation. The executive branch gained substantial power during the crisis, while legislative and judicial activities were partly suspended. Thus, the chapter highlights the role of expertise in crisis situations as well as, more generally, its function in democratic systems.0905202410.16993/bco.fhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.fhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/1d4e900c-19f8-4682-86e9-9ca00bd51c7d.pdfDavideCaselliUniversity of Bergamohttps://ror.org/02mbd5571Sociology of Environmenthttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7305-7436CarlottaMozzanaUniversity of Milano-Bicoccahttps://ror.org/01ynf4891Sociologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2217-2906Daniela R.PiccioUniversity of Torinohttps://ror.org/048tbm396Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4625-4941BarbaraSaracinoUniversity of Bolognahttps://ror.org/01111rn36Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3812-6699Italian citizens have become accustomed to the recurrent presence of experts in the country’s decision-making processes. As elsewhere in Europe, an increasing number of “technocrats” (i.e.: professionals with no former partisan involvement possessing recognized expertise which is directly relevant to the role occupied, see McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014), have been holding ministerial responsibilities. Only in the last three decades, moreover, in a context of general de-structuration of the Italian political landscape, the country experienced three fully technocratic governments, a record in a comparative perspective (Fabbrini 2015). Overall, scholars have found surprisingly high levels of citizens’ support for their political involvement, even in spite of the austerity measure they implemented (Bertsou and Caramani 2020; Ortoleva, 2012). Yet, never have experts played such a significant role in Italy’s decision-making processes as during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, when it has been the first and most hardly hit European country, currently featuring the enormous and still underestimated number of over 50.000 victims. The pandemic highlighted a number of significant structural problems of the Italian political and institutional fields, such as the quantitative and qualitative problems of public administration and public services and the uneven regional fragmentation of the social and healthcare system, particularly evident for the latter, marked by the scarcity of doctors and (in some regional models) the centralization of most of the activities within hospitals at the expense of territorial care (Giarelli, Vicarelli 2020, Gimbe 2019). In this context, shortly before the public recognition of the epidemic outbreak, the government declared the State of Emergency on 31st of January and, at the beginning of February 2020, the central and regional governments instituted “techno-scientific committees” (Comitato Tecnico Scientifico, CTS in Italian), i.e. collective entities charged of working with the political authorities in monitoring the epidemiological situation and adjusting and updating the emergency legislation for the sake of public health. From then onwards, Italy faced a fast sequence of emergency measures until 8 March 2020, with the declaration of the first severe nationwide lockdown in the European continent. In that context, a multiplicity of different committees were actually formed, at different levels. Apart from the CTS, over 15 national level task forces composed by over 450 experts were established at different ministries (Capano 2020) to deal with the more specific challenges posed by the Covid-19 crisis to individual policy sectors. Focusing on the scientific and medical fields, national and regional CTSs represented and still represent to this day the official, albeit territorially fragmented, expertise on Covid-19. They have been instituted and recognized by the political authorities, with which they have nevertheless had a controversial relationship, spanning from complete political submission to scientific and technical knowledge (“we will re-open economic activities only when Science agrees”) to the reclamation of the primacy of the political actors (“the scientists and experts are to serve the government and not the other way around”) resulting in a process of politicization of the expertise (Caselli 2020; Pellizzoni 2011). In this respect, particularly interesting is the recent construction and use of classification tools based on quantitative informational bases for assessing and defining local lockdowns: research shows the nexus between the cognitive and normative dimensions of policy making, as well as the process of politicization of expertise and depoliticization of politics (Mozzana 2019).0905202410.16993/bco.ghttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.ghttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/adfa1825-3f7e-49c1-9f1d-3656ba134341.pdfRutBermejo-CasadoRey Juan Carlos University (Madrid)Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-2453-312XThis chapter examines the role of experts in Spain's response to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Through analyzing key discourses and recommendations from experts and expert groups in official and mass media sources, it delves into the intricate network of advisory committees established. The findings reveal the significant contribution of a network of experts and committees, predominantly comprising civil servants, to Spain's pandemic management. While numerous experts internationally and nationally have offered insights and knowledge, many have been marginalized due to their recommendations being disregarded or unheard. Spanish politicians tended to align with experts who endorsed their agenda, often overlooking evidence-based policymaking principles. The chapter underscores the importance of addressing knowledge gaps to enhance policymaking effectiveness and adaptability (Boswell 2009, 5).0905202410.16993/bco.hhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.hhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/c1fb7411-1c3e-438e-aa75-ed19b982ea33.pdfZuzanaKotherováCharles Universityhttps://ror.org/024d6js02Institute of Public Healthhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1214-9879MichelPerottinoCharles Universityhttps://ror.org/024d6js02Political Sciencehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1910-4075The COVID-19 crisis has shed new light on a category of experts already well known in the Czech Republic, but long neglected and underfunded: epidemiologists. Faced with challenges that no one could have predicted, one name among epidemiologists stands out above all others: that of Professor Roman Prymula. At the outbreak of the pandemic, he was already part of the ministerial structure, in an important position (deputy minister), a position that had absolutely no link with his expertise as an epidemiologist. The pandemic and the uncertainty of the overwhelmed Czech authorities gave him new and an increasingly important role. When the first peak was over, Prymula left to let other epidemiologists take over. In reality, however, he never really disappeared, and his place - especially in the media - remained strong. Moreover, the prime minister offered him a new position - created ad hoc for him. Finally, during the second COVID wave, he was appointed Minister of Health. Thanks to a series of gradually opening windows of opportunity, Roman Prymula made his breakthrough. His meteoric rise, especially in the media, can certainly be attributed to his expertise and previous positions (soldier, director of a state hospital, links with the pharmaceutical industry), but also to his style (strict, even combative) and high ambition. The transformation of public health from a neglected sector to one of the most important and closely monitored in the health system is also not to be overlooked. Although Prymula was not the only epidemiologist in the Czech Republic, he was perceived as a leading, if not the only, expert. Another problem, less personal but no less important, is that in the Czech Republic we have seen the emergence of protests against the strict containment measures in the event of a pandemic. These protests are coming from other experts, particularly doctors and economists. This raises a new question(s): who can really be called an expert and on what basis, and who is an expert in what? More generally, the aim of the chapter is not only to highlight the meteoric rise of one expert, but also to explain the context, both political and medical-epidemiological, that made this rise possible.0905202410.16993/bco.ihttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.ihttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/37b4089d-24f4-4002-893a-531b8c8b0b42.pdfChristophe EmmanuelPrematStockholm Universityhttps://ror.org/05f0yaq80Department of Romance Studies and Classicshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6107-735XThe Swedish strategy received particular attention at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic due to the singular choice of not confining the population. If this strategy has been the target of many criticisms, its careful study reveals a rather original functioning of public policies. The political authorities used the administrative framework of the State to elaborate an official narrative overhanging the various opinions of the experts. State epidemiological expert Anders Tegnell has been in the spotlight to become a constant benchmark for the political positioning based on the state of information and knowledge. The chapter analyses the transformation of state expert into super-expert by showing how this discourse has produced collective coherence and obedience.0905202410.16993/bco.jhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.jhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/da3d1c9e-f9f9-454e-b7f2-1e566ea06142.pdfEstherDurinIHECS, BrusselsProtagoras, research centre in political and public communication.https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7870-9798BaptisteBuidinIHECS, BrusselsProtagoras, research centre in political and public communicationhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5694-8568The coronavirus crisis has upset the Belgian institutional balance, leading to an exceptional transfer of power to the federal government. This shift has remarkably put an end to the political crisis that the country was going through since the elections of May 2019. The Belgian management of the Covid-19 first followed its consociational tradition, through interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation with civil society. However, this cooperation was soon shaped by the evolution of relations between politicians and experts and conflicts over the definition of their respective roles and identities. To what extent have the experts assumed a political role? By doing so, did they act as partners, competitors, opponents, or even substitutes to the public authorities, particularly regarding communication with the citizens? To what extent has the collective and consensual ethos of the epistemic community given way to confrontational individual ethos? Drawing on political science research, this paper employs qualitative discourse analysis for studying the relations between politicians and experts during the COVID-19 crisis as painted by the press. Its corpus includes institutional and expert discourses, as well as their coverage by the main Belgian media, between 13 March and 30 November 2020. The analysis first aims at showing the role of self and other representations in the intersubjective construction of meaning and in the building of power relationships between main actors. It secondly focuses on the discursive formation and professional identity they use in their discourse : do they show themselves as knowledge producers or as political decision-makers? The results of the analysis outline three successive configurations. Within the first collegial configuration, political decision remains with the government, even if it relies on scientists’ expertise. Within the second configuration, still marked by collegiality but moving towards co-decision, the experts become partners of the political authorities. The third configuration breaks the collegiality and puts forward individualities – “super-experts” – in competition for decision-making and public communication ownership. The debate moved from consultation bodies’ meetings and press conferences to multiple and more pervasive public spaces. The press coverage of these alternative public spheres emphasises the constant renegotiation of identities between experts and politicians, leading towards a government of experts.0905202410.16993/bco.khttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.khttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/65eacf3d-047e-44ec-be06-ccaf8a624a23.pdfLilianNeguraUniversity of Ottawahttps://ror.org/03c4mmv16School of social workhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5224-5451YannickMasseUniversity of Ottawahttps://ror.org/03c4mmv16School of social workhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9412-4690NathaliePlanteUniversity of Quebec (Montreal)https://ror.org/002rjbv21https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5968-154XIn this chapter, we analyse the evolution of expert discourse in the media during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada. We begin with an overview of the use of expertise in the Canadian public-health decision-making chain in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the tensions, contradictions and paradoxes of political communication that this process revealed. These decisions were widely reflected and debated in the media, hence the relevance of studying them from the perspective of social representations. Based on our analysis of 527 media products published by CBC/Radio Canada between 1 January and 31 August 2020, it was possible to document the type of expertise mobilised, the types of experts engaged by the media, the modalities of appropriation of this discourse by non-experts and the use of expert discourse by political actors. The analysis of the governmental measures that have generated the most controversy and debate in the media has allowed us to reveal the public’s understanding of the pandemic through the process of representational naturalisation. Specifically, we show the role of expert discourse in determining which aspects of COVID-19 pandemic the public and political authorities in Canada have defined as a social problem.0905202410.16993/bco.lhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/chapters/e/10.16993/bco.lhttps://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/books/82/files/3282ee04-8aff-483e-9a1b-14bc9ef5ceae.pdf